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1 Question 1.
1. We need to find an expression for kt+1 as a function of kt. Thus we convert the given
equation for K into capital per effective unit of labour by dividing both sides by At+1Lt+1:
Kt+1
At+1Lt+1
=
(1− δ)Kt + sYt
At+1Lt+1
=
(1− δ)Kt + sYt
AtLt(1 + n)(1 + g)
=
kt(1− δ) + sf(kt)
(1 + g)(1 + n)
, (1)
which simplifies to
kt+1 =
[
1− δ
(1 + n)(1 + g)
]
kt +
[
s
(1 + n)(1 + g)
]
f(kt). (2)
By taking first and second derivative w.r.t. kt, we can get an idea about the shape of this
function.
∂kt+1
∂kt
=
[
1− δ
(1 + n)(1 + g)
]
+
[
sf ′(kt)
(1 + n)(1 + g)
]
> 0;
∂2kt+1
∂k2t
=
sf ′′(kt)
(1 + n)(1 + g)
< 0. (3)
Using the Inada conditions:
lim
k→0
∂kt+1
∂kt
=∞; lim
k→∞
∂kt+1
∂kt
=
1− δ
(1 + n)(1 + g)
< 1. (4)
Thus, the function eventually has a slope of less than one and will therefore cross the 45
degree line at some point, and just one point. Hence, the economy has a global equilibrium
and a balance grow path.
2. Substitute a Cobb-Douglas production function f(kt) = kαt into (2):
kt+1 =
[
1− δ
(1 + n)(1 + g)
]
kt +
[
s
(1 + n)(1 + g)
]
kαt . (5)
On a balanced growth path, kt+1 = kt = k?, thus:
k? =
[
1− δ
(1 + n)(1 + g)
]
k? +
[
s
(1 + n)(1 + g)
]
k?α. (6)
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Simplifying yields [
1− 1− δ
(1 + n)(1 + g)
]
k? =
[
s
(1 + n)(1 + g)
]
k?α,
k?1−α =
s
n+ g + ng + δ
,
k? =
[
s
n+ g + ng + δ
] 1
1−α
. (7)
2 Question 2.
1. The assumptions of the Diamond model are:
(a) There are infinite generations of individuals who live for two periods. If Lt is the
number of individuals born at t, the population growth rate, assuming time is discrete,
is exogenous and equal to n, hence
Lt = (1 + n)Lt−1. (8)
Each individual provides 1 unit of labour in the first period. He allocates consumption
across the two periods. Utility is given by:
Ut =
C1−θ1,t
1− θ +
1
1 + ρ
C1−θ2,t+1
1− θ with ρ > −1; θ > 0. (9)
(b) Production has the same properties as in the Ramsey model.
2. The maximum problem is:
max
Ct,Ct+1,λ
L = lnCt +
1
1 + ρ
lnCt+1 − λ
[
Ct +
1
1 + rt+1
Ct+1 −Atwt
]
(10)
FOCs are given by:
∂L
∂Ct
= C−1t − λ = 0; (11)
∂L
∂Ct+1
=
1
1 + ρ
C−1t+1 − λ
1
1 + rt+1
= 0; (12)
∂L
∂λ
= Ct +
1
1 + rt+1
Ct+1 −Atwt = 0. (13)
Dividing (11) by (12) yields (
Ct
Ct+1
)−1
=
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
Ct+1 = Ct
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
. (14)
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Substituting (14) in the budget constraint (13) yields:
Ct +
1
1 + rt+1
Ct+1 −Atwt = 0
Ct = Atwt − 1
1 + rt+1
Ct+1
= Atwt − 1
1 + rt+1
Ct
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
= Atwt
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
. (15)
We can now define savings as
st = 1− 1 + ρ
2 + ρ
=
1
2 + ρ
. (16)
The dynamics of K can be described as
Kt+1 = stAtwtLt
kt+1 = stwt
1
(1 + n)(1 + g)
kt+1 =
1
2 + ρ
1
(1 + n)(1 + g)
(1− α)kα. (17)
A discussion about the implication of relaxing the model’s assumption can be found on the
textbook (pagg. 85–88).
3. (a) A rise in n shifts the kt+1 function down, hence the new equilibrium will be k?N < k
?.
(b) As usual, we model such change by letting the production function f(kt) = γf(kt)
with γ < 1. The kt+1 function shifts down, and the new equilibrium will be k?N < k
?.
(c) We need to determine the effect on kt+1 for a given kt of a change in α:
∂kt+1
∂α
=
1
2 + ρ
1
(1 + n)(1 + g)
[
−kαt + (1− α)
∂kαt
∂α
]
. (18)
We need to determine ∂kαt /∂α. Note that ln f(α) = α ln f(α). Thus ∂lnf(α)/∂α =
ln kt. Now we can write:
∂f(α)
∂α
=
∂f(α)
∂ ln f(α)
∂ ln f(α)
∂α
=
1
∂ ln f(α)/∂f(α)
∂ ln f(α)
∂α
= f(α) ln kt. (19)
Substituting in (18) yields
∂kt+1
∂α
=
1
2 + ρ
1
(1 + n)(1 + g)
[
−kαt + (1− α)kαt ln kt
]
=
1
2 + ρ
1
(1 + n)(1 + g)
[
kαt [(1− α) ln kt − 1]
]
. (20)
Thus:
• For (1− α) ln kt > 1 the kt+1 function shifts up;
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• For (1− α) ln kt < 1 the kt+1 function shifts down;
• The new kt+1 function crosses the old one at (1− α) ln kt = 1.
(d) A fall in ρ shifts up the kt+1 function, hence the new equilibrium will be k?N > k
?.
(e) A positive depreciation rate δ > 0 implies that rt+1 = f ′(kt)− δ. This does not affect
the maximum problem, the solution of which is identical to the previous problem.
Dynamics of capital do not depend upon rt+1, hence the system does not change. If,
on the other hand, we consider the general case, dynamics of capital is now given by
kt+1 =
1
(1 + n)(1 + g)
st(f
′(kt+1 − δ))
[
f ′(kt)− ktf ′(kt)
]
. (21)
The relationship is the same but the new level of kt+1 depend on how saving variates
with rt+1.
4. Let us assume g = 0. The equilibrium value of k? is:
k? =
[
1
2 + ρ
1
(1 + n)
(1− α)
] 1
1−α
. (22)
Thus, the marginal product of capital on the balanced growth path is
f ′(k?) = αk?α−1 =
α
1− α (1 + n)(2 + ρ). (23)
The golden-rule capital stock is that which yields the highest balanced-growth-path value
of the economy’s total consumption per unit of effective labour. Total consumption is given
by c = f(k)− nk. The golden-rule capital stock is then obtain by deriving this expression
w.r.t. k. Golden-rule capital stock must satisfy f ′(kGR) = n.
f ′(k?) can be either higher or lower than f ′(kGR) = n. In particular, if α is small enough,
f ′(k?) < f ′(kGR): the capital stock on the balanced growth path exceeds the golden-rule
level.
This is Pareto inefficient. Assume there is a social planner, and that the economy is on its
balanced growth path with k? > kGR, and
c = f(k?)− nk?. (24)
Suppose the social planner decides to allocate more resources to consumption, so that in
the next period k? = kGR, and that he keeps such a level. Under his plan, resources per
worker available are:
t0 c = f(k
?) + (k? − kGR)− nkGR (25)
t1+ c = f(kGR)− nkGR. (26)
Since kGR maximises consumption, (26)>(24), and since k? > kGR, (25)>(26). This policy
makes more resources available in every period. Hence, the decentralised equilibrium is not
Pareto-efficient.
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3 Question 3.
1. (a) Utility is given by lnCt +
1
1 + ρ
lnCt+1. With the social security tax of τ per person,
the individual faces the following constraints:
Ct + St = Awt − τ ; (27)
Ct+1 = (1 + rt+1)St + (1 + n)τ. (28)
Solving (28) for St yields
St =
Ct+1
(1 + rt+1)
− 1 + n
1 + rt+1
τ. (29)
Substituting (29) into (27) yields
Ct +
Ct+1
(1 + rt+1)
= Awt − rt+1 − n
1 + rt+1
τ. (30)
We know from Question 2 that with logarithmic utility, the individual will consume
fraction (1 + ρ)/(2 + ρ) of his lifetime wealth in the first period, thus
Ct =
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
[
Awt − rt+1 − n
1 + rt+1
τ
]
, (31)
and, substituting in (27), we obtain
St = Awt − τ − 1 + ρ
2 + ρ
[
Awt − rt+1 − n
1 + rt+1
τ
]
=
[
1− 1 + ρ
2 + ρ
]
Awt −
[
1− 1 + ρ
2 + ρ
rt+1 − n
1 + rt+1
]
τ =
=
1
r + ρ
Awt −
[
(2 + ρ)(1 + rt+1)− (1 + ρ)(rt+1 − n)
(2 + ρ)(1 + rt+1)
]
τ
=
1
r + ρ
Awt − Ztτ. (32)
The tax reduces savings (whether more or less than proportionally depends upon the
magnitude of rt+1 − n). It is still true that Kt+1 is given by the total saving of the
young in period t, hence
Kt+1 = StLt
kt+1 =
1
1 + n
[
1
2 + ρ
wt − Zt τ
A
]
=
1
1 + n
[
1
2 + ρ
(1− α)kαt − Zt
τ
A
]
. (33)
This type of tax reduces the capital stock of the economy.
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(b) (Optional). If the economy was initially on its balanced growth path and dynamically
efficient, a marginal increase in τ would result in a gain to the old generation that
would receive extra benefits. However, it would reduce k? further below kGR and
thus leave further generation worse off, with lower consumption possibilities. If, on
the other hand, the economy was initially inefficient with k? > kGR, then a tax could
reduce or possibly eliminate the dynamic inefficiency caused by over-accumulation of
capital.
2. (a) Equation (28) now becomes
Ct+1 = (1 + rt+1)St + (1 + rt+1)τ
St =
Ct+1
1 + rt+1
− τ. (34)
Substituting into equation (27) yields
Ct +
Ct+1
1 + rt+1
− τ = Awt − τ, (35)
which is just the usual intertemporal budget constraint of the Diamond model. Thus
consumption in the first period is simply
Ct =
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
Awt. (36)
Substitution in (27) gives savings:
St = Awt − 1 + ρ
2 + ρ
Awt − τ
=
1
2 + ρ
Awt − τ. (37)
The social security tax causes a proportional reduction in private saving. Capital
stock in t+ 1 will be equal to
Kt+1 = StLt + τLt
kt+1 =
1
1 + n
[
1
2 + ρ
wt − τ
A
]
+
1
1 + n
τ
A
=
1
1 + n
1
2 + ρ
(1− α)kαt . (38)
Thus, this type of tax has no effect on the relationship between capital stock in
successive periods.
4 Question 4. (Optional).
1. The individual utility function is given by lnCt + lnCt+1 and the constraints are
Ct + Ft = A (39)
Ct+1 = xFt. (40)
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where Ft is the amount stored by the individual. Substituting, we obtain the intertemporal
budget constraint
Ct +
Ct+1
x
= A. (41)
The maximum problem is then given by
max
Ct,Ct+1,λ
L = lnCt + lnCt+1 − λ
[
Ct +
Ct+1
x
−A
]
. (42)
The FOCs are
∂L
∂Ct
= C−1t − λ = 0 (43)
∂L
∂Ct+1
= C−1t+1 −
λ
x
= 0 (44)
∂L
∂λ
= Ct +
Ct+1
x
−A = 0. (45)
Substituting (43) in (44) yields
Ct+1 = xCt. (46)
Substituting this into (45) yields
Ct + x
Ct
x
+A = 0 (47)
Ct =
A
2
, (48)
from which we obtain also
Ct+1 = x
A
2
. (49)
Hence, each individual consumes half of his endowment and stores the other half; when
old, he consumes Ct+1.
Consumption at time t is given by
Ct = C1,tLt + C2,tLt−1 =
A
2
Lt + x
A
2
Lt− 1. (50)
Dividing both sides for ALt yields consumption per unit of effective labour:
ct =
1
2
+
x
2(1 + n)
. (51)
Thus consumption depends upon the relationship between x and 1 + n, i.e. the return on
storage. If x < (1 + n), in particular, the equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient and a tax of the
type analysed in exercise 3.1 would increase welfare.
2. (a) (Incomplete markets).
i. Utility function and lifetime budget constraint are given by:
U = lnCt + lnCt+1, (52)
Q1Ct +Qt+1Ct+ 1 = Qt(A− St) +Qt+1xSt. (53)
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From problem 4.1 we know that Ct = A/2. The individual can sell one unit of
the good in period t for Qt and in period t+1 it costs Qt+1 to obtain one unit of
the good. Thus, for Qt it is possible to obtain Qt/Qt+1 units of the good, which
is the gross rate of return on trading.
If the auctioneer announces Qt+1 = Qt/x for all t > 0, then x = Qt/Qt+1: the
rate of return on storage is equal to the rate of return on trading, hence the
individual is indifferent as to the amount to store and the amount to trade.
Suppose the individual sells at ∈ [0, 1] of its savings A/2 in period t. This allows
the individual to buy at(Qt/Qt+1)(A/2) when he is old. The stored quantity is
then:
St = (1− at)(A/2). (54)
Consumption in t+ 1 will then be
Ct+1 = at(Qt/Qt+1)(A/2) + (1− at)x(A/2)
= atx(A/2) + (1− at)x(A/2) = x(A/2). (55)
Let us consider some period t+1. Aggregate supply is equal to the total number
of young L times the amount each of them wants to sell, at+1(A/2). Aggregate
demand is equal to the number of old L times the amount each of them wants
to purchase, (Qt/Qt+1)at(A/2). For market to clear, demand must equal supply,
thus:
Lat+1(A/2) = L(Qt/Qt+1)at(A/2)
at+1 = (Qt/Qt+1)at
at+1 = xat. (56)
Since in time 0 old individuals simply consume their endowment, a0 = 0 in order
to clear the market in period 0. Thus, at = 0∀t ≥ 0. Hence, the equilibrium is
the same as in exercise (4.1.).
ii. If x < (Qt/Qt+1) from some date t, return on trading is greater than return on
storage, hence young individuals will want to sell all their saving (at = 1). Old
individuals, though, based their decision on how much to buy when old on the
condition x = (Qt/Qt+1), so they were not planning to buy anything (aggregate
demand is zero, which is less than aggregate supply). Hence, market will not clear
and there will be no equilibrium.
Similarly, if x < (Qt/Qt+1) from some date t, return on trading is lower than
return on storage and young individuals will want to save all their endowment
and buy A/2. Since the condition for the old individuals has not changed and
they do not want to sell, aggregated supply is zero (while demand is positive),
market will not clear.
(b) (Infinite duration).
i. Consider the social planner problem. He can divide the resources available for
consumption between young and old in any way he wants. If he takes btA from
the young and give it to the old, the latter will increase their consumption by btA
(n = 0, so population is constant). Since 0 < x < 1, this method of transferring
provides a better return than storage. If the economy did not end, the planner
could require each generation of the young to do the same thing. Since though
the economy ends at T , the planner cannot do such a thing. Taking anything
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from the young at date T would make them worse off since the planner cannot
give them anything in return the next period (there is no next period). Thus,
there is no Paretian improvement the social planner can enforce: the decentralised
equilibrium is Pareto-efficient.
(c) The source of dynamic inefficiency is infinite duration. Allowing individuals to trade
before the star of time requires a price path that results in an equilibrium equivalent to
the case in which such a market does not exist, which is not Pareto-efficient. However,
removing infinite duration removes the social planner’s ability to Pareto improve the
equilibrium.
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